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Abstract:   The protection of savings and the creation of insurance schemes is becoming a
hot topic for the European Union Regulator: incoming Directives seem to state a sort of
"financial guarantee scheme model" valid not only for deposit insurance but also for
investor compensation schemes in case of failure of investment firms.  We describe the
ongoing process, focusing on the recently approved deposit-guarantee scheme Directive
which will compel the Member States to redraw their internal regulation; then, using a very
simple game, we study the effects on the equilibria of different kinds of institutional
regulations.  The normative results, especially from this last analysis, are not easy to state:
however, using also some results of Di Noia (1994a and 1994b), we end up with some
suggestions on the way of regulating the single DIAs in the EU Member States.Contents
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1. Introduction
The progressive evolution and globalization of capital markets and instruments
and the various crises of intermediaries in these years have transformed the way of
thinking about the protection of savings, which is no more considered exhausted by
supervisory and prudential controls and capital adequacy requirements. The ex-
perience of many countries shows, in fact, that, beyond the regulating and control
authorities that supply “indirect protection”
1 to savings, there exist instruments
l We mean by “indirect protection”,  latu sensu, the set of the various regulations that super-
visory authorities use to try to reduce the possibility of insolvency of the intermediaries;  stricto
2of so called “direct protection” like insurance funds or, in general, schemes that
guarantee in some ways against the failure of the intermediaries: these schemes
operate not only for banks (for example the FDIC)) but also for intermediaries in
capital markets (say the Securities Investor Protection Corporation which protects
customers of securities broker-dealers), pension funds or insurance companies. The
opportunity of the introduction of such schemes does not necessarily depend on
the failure of regulation or inability of supervisory authority or distrust of savers
towards the functioning of financial markets but, on the contrary, on the different
risks intrinsic in the nature of every kind of intermediation. It is obvious that
the guarantee of the absolute stability of the intermediary could be obtained only
with a very strict control that would influence so much the managerial choices to
annihilate them. But, in this trade off between stability, competition, efficiency
of markets and intermediaries and protection of savers, the creation of guarantee
schemes can result in a very useful complement, contributing to reinforce financial
stability, too. The importance of the various kind of schemes is different given the
characteristic of the intermediary, its activities and the risks involved, the nature
of the fund (public or private; compulsory or voluntary), the coverage and the
way of financing. Then, different regulation have different effects.
For example, the institutional framework for a deposit insurance agency (DIA)
is determinant for pursuing efficiently the aim for which it has been created.
Different regulation, both of the structure of the agency and of the ways it acts,
have different effects on the aims which a DIA generally pursues (Guttentag and
Herring (1987)): to avoid or at least reduce the probability y and gravity of bank
runs; to protect small depositors; to equalize the competitive position of small
banks (which generally have small depositors as customers) with respect to big
banks (assumed to be safer due to the “too big to fail principle”).
It seems very interesting to study this problem because the process of harmo-
nization of the legislations of the countries belonging to the European Union will
soon involve banking deposit insurance, too, compelling all States to restructure
their agencies (if any) or to create it (if none).
After having described the ongoing process set up by the EU legislator, we
will analyze the implications of the Directive and the possible scenario; then, we
will use a very simplified framework a la “ Diamond- Dybvig”, to study the effect
of various ways of intervention of a DIA on the equilibria of a “bank run” game
to check, albeit very abstractly, if something useful can come out from the theory
sensu, the set of regulations that disciplines the structural, functional and behavioral profile of
financial intermediaries (Ruta (1970)).
3and what may be some consequences of the regulating options of the European
policy makers.
The normative results, especially from this last analysis, are not easy to state
because, following Fratianni (1994), deposit insurance, bank regulation and bank
supervision are not independent activities, while present regulatory theory does
not give clear cut recommendations due to the complexity of welfare analysis
(Vives (1991)): however, using also some of our results in Di Noia (1994a and
1994b), we end up with some suggestions on the way of regulating the single
DIAs in the EU Member States.
2. The institutional framework in Europe
In 1986 the European Commission had approved a formal Recommendation (n.
87/63) trying to persuade the Member States of the importance of the creations
of systems of deposit guarantee since, at that time, only some countries
2  had a de-
posit insurance scheme while others
3  were about to set it and the remaining ones
4
had not even approached the problem. There was no quantitative or percentage
limit on the coverage but this document already stated some relevant theoretical
points:
-deposit insurance is seen as protection for the weak depositor i.e. for those
who do not have instruments to adequately evaluate financial policies of the bank
which they lend money to;
-joining the insurance system must be compulsory for all the banks, including
the branches of foreign banks;
-there is no discrimination between private and public system given the differ-
ent structures of the banking systems in the countries.
The Recommendation, though not a compulsory document for the member
states, has been slowly implemented: by December 31st 1993, 11 countries out
of 12 have their guarantee system
5  but, in spite of the Recommendation, the
2Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Holland and UK.
31taly, Ireland and Portugal.
4Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg.
5In spite of that, “the most striking feature of deposit insurance in Europe is that it remains
largely unknown to the public. The explanation relies probably on the fact that it is common
knowledge in Europe that banks in trouble will be bailed out by the government and taxpayers,
and not depositors, will foot the bill” (Vives (1991)).
4situation is still heterogeneous, as the following table shows
6.
As it is visible, Greece has not a DIA yet; the coverage in Germany
less infinite, being up to 1/3 of bank’s own fund per depositor; the way
the DIA is different (ex ante or upon request), proportional or regressive like in
is more or
of funding
France or (slightly) in Italy, with eventual intervention of the Central Bank (as
6We also inserted major countries outside EU. For USA, we just refer to commercial banks
which are part of the FED system and joining FDIC.
For Switzerland, the commitment to payments in the event of calls is mixed because there
is one basic contribution amounting to SFR 250 per SFR 1 million in profits before tax with a
maximum of SFR 200,000. Banks with profits before tax of less than 2 million are exempt from
the basic contribution. Then there is one variable contribution calculated as a percentage of the
bank’s customer savings and deposit accounts covered by the system as compared with the total
of savings and deposit accounts of all the banks adhering to the scheme. If the amount to be
covered following the bankruptcy of a bank is less than SFR 10 million, the basic contribution is
reduced so that it does not exceed 30% of the total amount to be recovered (Federation Bancaire
(1993)).
5in Spain, where it provides a contribution of 0.075% of total bank deposits); the
maximum coverage has a big range; the origin of the DIA is public or private.
This situation convinced the EU Commission of the need to propose a Direc-
tive, which is a compulsory document to be implemented in the single countries’
legislation. The first “preliminary draft directive on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to deposit guarantees schemes”
dates October 1991; the official proposal of directive is of April 14th, 1992 (OJ C
n. 163/1992) and the modified proposal is of June 7th 1993 (OJ C n. 178/1993);
on September 13th 1993 the EU’s finance ministers approved the common position
and, finally, on May 30th 1994 the directive was released (n. 19/1994).
2.1. The proposal for a Directive on investor compensation schemes
In the meanwhile, the Commission has presented a proposal for a directive on
“investor compensation schemes” (September 22nd, 1993, COM(93) 381) as a
necessary supplement to the Investment Services directive
7 (93/22/EEC) com-
pletely symmetric to the deposit guarantee directive, as it is later described. The
need for this proposal, according to the regulator’s explanatory memorandum, is
that, even if the failure of an investment firm should be a relatively exceptional
event, given the supervision and prudential rules, it can sometimes occur espe-
cially because “no rules can prevent fraud” (p. 4). The objective of this proposal
is to insure investor protection and thus encourage the small investors in particu-
lar to invest in securities. Many countries have already an investor compensation
schemes
8, but the regulations and scope are very different: as it is clear from the
following tables (taken from the explanatory memorandum of the proposal), the
coverage is much different in the amount and in the type of customer; the firms
covered are often just the member of the Stock exchange; the way of financing
is quite different; the intervention is not always compulsory. That is why the
harmonization of the systems seem necessary: “in order to avoid causing confu-
sion in the minds of investors and to give them equal confidence when dealing
with non-domestic investment firms operating via branches or through the cross-
frontier provision of services as when they deal with domestically incorporated
investment firms, it seems reasonable and indeed necessary to provide for some
7Which establishes a common definition of investment firms and, by virtue of mutual recog-
nition, that investment firms authorized in their home Country may carry on any or all the
services covered by the Directive for which they have received authorization throughout the
European Union by establishing branches or under the freedom to provide services.
8Actually, USA has something similar, the SIPC.
6minimum investor compensation arrangements throughout the EU covering the
case where an investment firm fails and is unable to return to investors the money
or securities belonging to them”
9.
Briefly, it states that in each Member State an investor compensation scheme
(or schemes) is established and officially recognized and all the investment firms
must join the system. The scheme must provide cover to investors in case “the
investment firm is unable or likely to be unable to meet its obligation resulting
from investors claims”. There is, in principle, a home country system protection
as the scheme must cover also the foreign branches of an investment firm au-
thorized in its countries
l0. The minimum coverage is 20,000 ECU but a certain
tion is to be calculated and paid per investor rather than on a per account basis
and money and instrument in any currency should be covered (art. 6). Note
that the instruments covered are the ones described in Section B of the Invest-
ment Service Directive and thus they comprehend also futures, options, swaps and
f.r.a.. As usual some categories may be excluded from the compensation, like, not
only directors and managers, but also other investment firms, credit institutions,
financial institutions, insurance undertakings, pension funds.
The very interesting point is that this proposal is relevant also for banks,
as they not only deal with deposits but also trade securities on behalf of their
customers and may hold clients’ securities on a temporary or long term basis but
such securities do not appear on the bank’s balance sheet. That is why banks
are requested to join the investor compensation scheme. Besides it may be difficult
to distinguish between ordinary bank deposits and money that is intended for
the purchase of securities or is derived from their sale: Member States should
be allowed to decide for themselves whether such claims fall under the investor
compensation Directive or the deposit-guarantee Directive (art. 2).
This point has very important potential dangerous consequences. With the
approval and implementation of the Second Banking Coordination Directive and
of the Investment Services Directive all the obstacles to the creation of true uni-
versal banks (including the direct access in the Stock Exchanges) are eliminated
but with possible increased systemic instability: on one side crises originating
from the traditional banking activities may reflect in the access to the safety net
studied exclusively for the capital market intermediation (i.e. investor compen-
9Explanatory memorandum, p. 5.
10There is an exception in that the foreign branch of a firm whose home country offers a
coverage less than the host country can join this last system to supplement its coverage (art. 4).
7sation schemes); on the other side, crises originating from not banking sectors
may have to be solved with the use of instrument arranged not for that purpose
(deposit insurance, lender of last resort, public intervention to bail out bank in
difficulties).
2.2. Features of the deposit-guarantee scheme Directive and economic
theory
2.2.1. Aims of the Directive
The structure of the directive and especially of the introductory recitals allows
us to understand which part of economic literature had guided the European
legislator in regulating deposit guarantee schemes.
Even this directive, like all the preceding ones regarding banking, wants to pro-
mote “the harmonious development of the activities of credit institutions through-
out the Community (... ) through the elimination of all restrictions on the right of
establishment and the freedom to provide services, while increasing the stability
of the banking system and the protection for savers”
11.
The Directive has two main aims
12: on the one hand, to protect, in case of
the crisis of a credit institution, the depositors and, in particular, those who lack
sufficient financial knowledge to distinguish solvent banks from those who are not;
on the other hand, to avoid runs not only on banks in difficulty but also on other
banks in relatively sound condition due to unfounded rumors and, in this way, to
ensure the stability of the banking system as a whole.
Pursuing these two aims is a priority for the European policy maker regardless
of any consideration of costs and financing of the guarantee scheme: in fact “the
cost to credit institutions of participating in a guarantee scheme bears no relation
to the cost that would result from a massive withdrawal of bank deposits not only
from a credit institution in difficulties but also from healthy institutions following
a loss of depositor confidence in the soundness of the banking system”
13. What
does it mean at a theoretical level?
First of all
14, if a bank run happens, it might cause a generalized run to all
111st recital of the Common Position (all the following reminders refer to it).
12Stated in the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee in OJ C 332, 16.12.1992, p.
13, and in explanatory memorandum of the Proposal (COM(92) 188, 6/4/1992).
134th recital.
14To have a complete review of the literature, see, for example, FDIC (1983 and 1989),
Fratianni and Huang (1993) and Fratianni (1994).
8the banks of the system (i.e. a bank panic), as depositors may think that the cost
of intervening on the bank in difficulty can not be borne by the insurance agency
(if public) or by the banks joining the interbank agreement. This is even more
probable if the resources are only callable upon request, thus paid out only ex post
and not ex ante, for credibility problems. Besides, a panic by definition spreads
all over just at the sight of people queuing up at a bank or simply due to sunspots
(Cass-Shell (1983)): actually, it is perfectly rational to run even on a healthy bank
if others are withdrawing their deposits, because, due to the hurry of liquidating
the assets to pay back depositors, the bank is likely to bear many losses.
Then, more important for the EU Commission, a run can degenerate in panic
simply due to another information problem: when rumors (even unjustified) are
spread, depositors, not having perfect information about the assets of their banks
and so being doubtful, immediately withdraw. As this happen for all depositors
of all banks, it comes out a panic: it is the nature of banks itself, with this
special kind of liabilities what causes instability. The famous case of the crisis of
Continental Illinois can show perfectly this point: there is not a run on the bank
but a run on the whole banking system. As it is visible from the graph, taken from
Herring (1994), the spread between CD’s and T-bills widened suddenly during the
period May-June 1984, because many people withdrew their deposits from many
banks
15  buying “safer” T-bills.
2.2.2. The cost of a run
Which is “the cost that would result from a massive withdrawal of bank deposits”?
And the cost of a guarantee scheme?
According to Diamond-Dybvig (1983) (DD in the following), during this situa-
tion “there is a disruption of the monetary system and a reduction in production”.
It is certainly true that a panic causes a contraction of money supply, but only if
deposits are transformed into currency and not deposited in another bank (which
is more frequent during a bank run). The withdrawal of deposits obliges the bank
to recall loans so that firms may have difficulties even in finding currencies for
current expenses; the examination of the real sector activity during a panic shows
that it reduces substantially (Chari (1989)), even if the post-war experience should
l5If the run had been only on Continental, it would not have affected the whole market in
this way. This is also one of the few reasons why banks, in spite of the increasing competition,
want to rescue other banks in difficulty, instead of let them fail, by having deposit insurance
even governed by interbank agreements and, in any case, with premia paid by banks.
9convince us that the elimination of panics does not mean the elimination of eco-
nomic cycles. In this context, the task of monetary Authorities should be to insert
liquidity in the system to compensate the quantity of money destroyed: otherwise,
as Friedman-Schwartz (1963) explains, a great depression can result. Bernanke
(1983) analyzes how bank runs and broad failures could reduce the efficiency of
financial sector in pursuing its intermediation function because the real cost of
intermediation between lenders and borrowers increases and verifies empirically
the existence of a correlation between the higher cost of intermediation and the
decline of aggregate output.
But the real social cost of a run (and a fortiori of a panic) is the destruction
of information, because, as time elapses, the bank, due to its loan relationship
with firms, acquires an informative heritage which is destroyed by a failure caused
by a run and difficult to build again. As Matutes and Vives (1994) summarize,
this social cost (external and not internalized by the bank) consists of the loss
of informational capital (built up with monitoring borrowers throughout years),
destruction of long-term relationship of borrowers of the bank (who have to find
other lines of credit to continue their business) illiquidity costs of deposit holders
(with a wealth effect which could induce a fall in aggregate demand), disruption in
the payment system (interrupting the clearing process, inducing perhaps a failure
in interbank settlements), and contagion effects (the failure of a bank carries bad
news for another bank with a similar portfolio and can trigger its failure): the
social cost seem so big that any kind of devices to avoid it seem appropriate.
2.2.3. The solutions of the Directive
The directive requires, in principle, every credit institution, authorized in a Mem-
ber State under Article 3 of Directive 77/780 (the so called First Banking Co-
ordination Directive), to join a deposit-guarantee scheme
16; if no such scheme is
16Un]ess it already belongs “to a system which Protects the credit institution itself and in
particular ensures its liquidity and solvency, thus guaranteeing protection for depositors at least
equivalent to that provided by a deposit guarantee scheme”, and with some conditions (art.
3). It is not clear the logic of this article which cannot refer to an implicit guarantee of the
government, because this alternative system” must not consist of a guarantee granted to a credit
institution by a Member State itself or by any of its local or regional authorities”. It cannot be
a prefiguration of a competitive system of many (possibly private) insurance firms because this
alternative system “must be in existence and have been officially recognized when this Directive
is adopted”.
Could it be that the regulator refers to a permanent lender of last resort committed to
intervene?
10present, each Member State “shall ensure that within its territory one or more
deposit guarantee schemes are introduced and officially recognized” (art. 3), by
7/1/1995. The minimum deposit guarantee is set
17 at 20,000 ECU per depositor
18,
but Member States can introduce a partial coinsurance to leave some market dis-
until the amount to be paid under the guarantee reaches 20,000 ECU
19. Actu-
ally, “the only unaggregated data readily available to the (EU) Commission relate
to the average size of deposits held at Community savings banks. The average
for such deposits is about ECU 2,500, which reflects a weighted average of ECU
30,000 for time deposits, ECU 2,600 for current accounts and ECU 2,150 for sav-
ings account” (explanatory memorandum, p.5)
20. But without direct empirical
evidence on the size and distribution of accounts, the 20,000 ECU has been cho-
sen as a reasonable average among the existent schemes
21. Schemes that have
higher coverage can, of course, keep it.
The scheme is obviously surrogated to the rights of depositors in liquidation
proceedings for an amount equal to their payments (art. 11).
As usual, interbank deposits are not covered
22 while certain types of depositors,
due to their financial expertise or closeness to the bank, may be excluded (annex I
of the Directive), like financial institutions, insurance undertakings, governments
and other central and local authorities, collective investment undertakings, pen-
sion funds, bank’s managers, their relatives, and people with non nominative
deposits; finally all deposits in currencies other than those of Member States and
ecus, debt securities, and deposits for which the depositor has, on an individual
17Even if until 12/31/1999, Member States in which, when this Directive is adopted, deposits
are not covered up to 20.000 ECU, may limit the guarantee to 15.000 ECU (art. 7).
18And not per depositor, like in Italy up till now.
19It is interesting to notice that the reason why the possibility of partial coinsurance has been
introduced is “in order to take account of the anxieties, in particular of economists and financial
experts who would like part of the risks to be borne by depositors” (expl. memo, p. 15).
20This figure has been criticized from the Economic and Social Committee (OJ C 332,
12/16/1992, p.13), who defined them not very convincing and statistically incorrect (p.16):
first of all, the figures keep changing such that at the end of 1990 they were 26,500 for time
deposits, 3,000 for current accounts and 2,200 for savings account. Moreover, they were average
figures of the Union of the Saving Banks in the EU for 12 countries and 201.4 millions of saving
accounts, 55.5 millions of current accounts and 2.9 millions of time deposits. So any average of
that would be biased; in any case, the greater amount fixed considering the average coverage of
the existing schemes seem correct.
21Excluding the two “outliers”, Germany and Italy, as you can see from the previous table.
22“Own funds” and deposits arising out of “money laundering” are excluded, either (art. 2).basis, obtained rates and financial concessions which have helped to aggravate the
financial situation of the bank may not be covered, either. The list is limitative
in the sense that Member States cannot exclude anyone else not listed there
23.
One of the most delicate and important points of the proposal was the setting
of the promptest possible payout of the guarantee provided by the scheme. The
final solution, stated in art. 10, is that, in principle, the scheme must pay the
claims by depositors within three months of the date on which the competent
authorities declared it “unavailable” 
24, but there are some exceptions which may
sensibly lengthen it.
The coordination among DIAs of different countries is in principle easy, follow-
ing the home country rule: foreign branches of national banks are covered by their
home country DIA, with two very relevant exceptions. In fact, “whereas the re-
tention in the Community of schemes providing cover for deposits which is higher
than the harmonized minimum way, within the same territory, lead to disparities
in compensation and unequal conditions of competition between national insti-
tutions and branches of institutions from other Member States’’ 
25, then, in order
to counteract those disadvantages, those branches, whose home country scheme
23Actually, a great discretionality is given by the 3rd paragraph of art. 7 stating that the
20,000 ECU limit “shall not preclude the retention or adoption of provisions which offer a
higher or more comprehensive cover for deposits. In particular, deposit-guarantee schemes may,
on social considerations, cover certain kinds of deposits in full”.
24Art. 1 defines an “unavailable deposit” as “a deposit that is due and payable but has not
been paid by a credit institution under the legal and contractual conditions applicable thereto,
where either:
(i) the relevant competent authorities have determined that in their view the credit institution
concerned appears to be unable for the time being, for reasons which are directly related to its
financial circumstances, to repay the deposit and to have no current prospect of being able to
do so.
The competent authorities shall decide whether to make this determination, as soon as possible
and not beyond 21 days after first becoming satisfied that a credit institution has failed to repay
a deposit which is due and payable.
Or
(ii) a judicial authority has made a ruling for reasons which are directly related to the credit
institution’s financial circumstances which has the effect of suspending depositors’ ability to
make claims against it, should that occur before the aforementioned determination has been
made”. Thus, the timing of this decision can be very long without any maximum limit for the
authority. This statement is much worse for depositors than the original Proposal which stated
a sufficient condition for unavailability as the suspension of payments for ten consecutive days,
with no need of a declaration or a decision of a judicial or administrative authority (art. 1 of
the Proposal).
2513th recital.
12coverage is less than what the host system offers, may join voluntarily the host
country DIA in order to supplement the guarantee which its depositors already
enjoy by virtue of its membership of its home Member State scheme (art. 4).
Besides, “whereas market disturbances could be caused by branches of credit in-
stitutions which offer level of cover higher than those offered by credit institutions
authorized in their host Member States; whereas it is not appropriate that the
level or scope of cover offered by guarantee schemes should become an instrument
of competition”
26, then, until 31/12/1999, neither the level or the scope, including
the percentage, of cover provided by home country DIA shall exceed the maximum
level or scope of cover offered by the corresponding guarantee scheme within the
territory of the host Member State (art. 4).
These solutions represent an obvious political mediation between different po-
sitions. In spite of the annex II which states some guiding principles, the first
exception seem dangerous given that with the home country control rule, the host
country agency has incomplete information about the foreign branch; having to
choose between two extremes, we think that it would have been better to use the
home country rule also for the supplementary guarantee, setting the premia equal
to what the banks normally pay in the host country.
In order for the guarantee scheme to achieve its goal, a complete information
about who, when and what is insured is important: that is why art. 9 strictly
regulate the point, imposing a readable and comprehensible information to all
consumers. What seems interesting is the invitation to Member States to set
rules limiting the use in advertising of some relevant information, regarding the
bank and the guarantee scheme, which may affect the stability of the banking
system or depositor confidence
27.
The Directive allows the Member States to decide the methods of financing
DIAs, even if the cost of financing such schemes must be borne, in principle, by
credit institutions themselves but, on the other hand, the financing capacity of
such schemes must be in proportion to their liabilities, “whereas this must not,
however, jeopardize the stability of the Member State concerned” (23rd recital).
It does not tackle the problem of the legal status of the guarantee scheme, too, due
to the diversity of arrangements in the States, as the private schemes “are just as
effective as the schemes managed by or with the assistance of public authorities”
2614th recital.
27 Think of the case where a bank invites people to withdraw funds from another bank, making
publicly know that its premia to the scheme are not the same (like in USA it could be 23 cents
versus 31 cents per 100$) belonging to different supervisory groups.
13(expl. memo, p.7).
Of course, as in every EU Directive, the treatment is different for branches
of banks from non Member States. Member States have to check if they have a
cover equivalent to the 20.000 ECU: “failing that, Member States may, subject
to Article 9(1) of Directive 77/780/EEC, stipulate that branches established by
a credit institution which has its head office outwith the Community must join
deposit-guarantee schemes in operation within their territories” (art .6).
2.2.4. The possible scenarios
It is not easy now to evaluate the consequences in economic terms of the inno-
vations that will happen due to the Directive because, as already stated, it has
recently been approved and the EU countries will have to implement it in their
legislation.
The fundamental principle to oblige all the countries to have a deposit insur-
ance scheme is not in discussion.
What puzzles is the solution, above described, for the coordination of the
different schemes. Even if the European legislator wanted to avoid competition
among different insurance schemes, the device thought does not seem either clear,
or well-done or even necessary.
In fact, whatever happens with the treatment of branches abroad (of domestic
banks) and of domestic branch of foreign banks, a certain degree of competition
among insurance systems can in any case arise. In part this has already happened
because, with the complete liberalization of capital movements, every citizen not
only can open a deposit account in a foreign currency in his national territory
but especially can open it abroad without restrictions
28: the cost of transactions,
psychological factors and habits have kept low this interchange of deposits of small
and unsophisticated depositors, while professional investors with great sums of
money (less sensible to the above factors) did not have to wait liberalization to
spread their capital all over Europe.
Among the important psychological factors, there is the uncertainty of de-
positors on the soundness of the bank but this is going to sharply decrease with
the directive even for deposits over the minimal amount insured, as the single
countries can have guarantee systems which insure greater amounts.
Finally, apart from the specific legal solution to implement the directive in
28Even if for example, in Italy, there are still “psychological” limitations caused by the com-
pulsory notification to the Authorities of every transaction above 20 million lire.
14each country, it will be possible for depositors to choose among banks that join
different deposit insurance schemes.
So what seems realistic, is to forecast that the demand deposit function in Eu-
rope could be influenced by the coefficient of insurance protection on the deposit 
29:
ceteris paribus, a depositor will open his account where is higher the limit of cov-
erage of his deposit and, given the limit, where the percentage covered is higher
30.
It may happen, due to the usual moral hazard problem, that riskier banks may
offer higher rates of interest on deposits, getting them as soon as they are under
the limit of insurance. The two obvious solutions to that are risk based premia
whose marginal cost should be higher than the marginal revenue from having
more deposits to invest (even at a higher rate) and especially coinsurance exploit-
20,000 ECU (perhaps it could be left the 100% till 10,000 ECU).
In this case, the national policy makers of the different countries could be
tempted to raise their rate of coverage to attract in the national banks
31 de-
posits from abroad: namely, the national policy maker may want to maximize
the amount of deposits in his system, if he considers this variable an instrumen-
tal objective to economic growth. In order to check which could be the effect
of this behavior, we thought in Di Noia (1994a) to analytically implement this
considerations in a simple model of the credit market which reflects the Italian
institutional framework (Arcelli (1991)), so to make some exercises of comparative
statics to approximately simulate this consequences: we showed that the Member
States that “were fearing that high-insurance countries would be more competitive
in attracting deposits than low-insurance countries” (Fratianni (1994)) may have
nothing to worry about, so that their lobbying for this feature of the Directive was
wrong. In fact, given some conditions on the elasticities on supply and demand
of deposits, an increase in the rate of coverage may, perhaps unexpectedly, cause
an aggregate decrease of the deposits in the system
32.
29Given our preceding considerations, at this step it is still not interesting to look for some
econometric estimation of the incidence of this factor: in fact, not only the directive has just
been approved, but especially the very different systems are not all compelled to reimburse
depositors and in any case the liberalization of capital movements is too recent to dispose of
meaningful time series.
300therwise - it is the same - we could think as explanatory variable the coverage differential
among banks.
31Or even in the national branches of foreign banks, given that they reinvest in his nation.
32While there is a decrease in the rate of interest paid on them: this is quite normal because
it is plausible to think that depositors may accept to earn less interest if a greater protection is
15What seems reasonable to forecast (and/or to advise) is setting two different
level of the insurance (Fratianni (1993)): each scheme should offer only the mini-
mal guarantee of 20,000 ECU on a compulsory basis so to avoid some, even if not
all of the above mentioned coordination problems; this part could be even based on
flat premia or, better, on risk based premia following the mixed model of FDCIA.
Then on a voluntary basis and very tough standard to join the scheme, it could be
offered an optional coverage, even without limit, on risk based premia which prob-
ably would attract more depositors but should be more easily translated on them:
this solution would allow countries whose tradition is to offer more protection, to
keep the system without drastic changes which could undermine stability.
3. An “institutional” game
Now, we want to address the topic of making a simple exercise to show how
different institutional arrangements of a DIA can change the equilibria of a game,
assuming that an eventual policy maker’s aim is to avoid that a bank run is a pure
Nash equilibrium
33, thinking in this way to keep financial stability 
34. Our result,
in this framework, is that not necessarily the introduction of a DIA eliminates the
run as a Nash equilibrium but only in some institutional arrangements.
It is widely known that banks can be seen as producers of a transformation
service of illiquid assets into short term liquid liabilities, providing liquidity in-
surance to risk averse consumers facing private liquidity risk (DD). “The optimal
deposit contract involves a fixed payment to early withdrawers and has a good
equilibrium which realizes optimal risk sharing but also has a bad equilibrium in
which all depositors panic, withdraw their funds and the bank collapses” (Vives
(1991)).
The model we are using for this exercise is very simple, as it just wants to
offered.
33A main criticism can be done to these assumption: why ever should a policy maker care
of Nash equilibria? Actually, “the fact that Nash equilibria pass the test of being consistent
predictions does not make them good predictions, and in situations it seems rash to think that
a precise prediction is available” because it depends in reality on more information (Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991)). Nevertheless, we simply mean that “a Nash equilibrium, and only a Nash
equilibrium, can have the property that the players can predict it, predict that their opponents
predict it, and so on” (ibidem)  and so no player has incentive to deviate: that is why, ex-ante,
is a very reasonable outcome. Another criticism could be that a policy maker may not know
what is a Nash equilibrium: but we cannot find a solution to this.
34 Keeping stability in financial markets is, for Solow (1982), a kind of public good.
16tackle the different institutional arrangements of
following:
a DIA. Its description is the
of money but it is of course implicit that they come out from Von Neumann-
Morgestern utility function.
The story behind the game is a simplified textbook version of the usual DD
36,
slightly modified to take into account more realistic features (like reserve require-
ments) and the new institutional aspects introduced by the directive (like the fact
that the DIA has to intervene not at the end of a very long process but as soon
as the deposits become “unavailable”).
Two investors have each supplied inelastically a deposit D in the bank
37. The
bank has invested these deposits in a long-term project so that, if the bank is
forced to liquidate its investment before the project matures, only a lower sum
the banks allows the investment to reach maturity, however, the project will pay
out a total of 2R, where R > D.
In the usual story, there are two dates at which the investors can make with-
drawals from the bank
40. Date 1 is before the bank’s investment matures and
35This assumption does not change the result: it can be shown that the more realistic as-
game. What change is simply that it could be possible a situation where few enough deposi-
tors withdraw and the schemes makes all participant better off, but this is not an individually
rational strategy, which is to withdraw if it is the strategy others are playing.
36Like in Gibbons (1992), for example.
37We do not deal with the optimality of the deposit contract and why, so, the agent should
choose this type of contract, given our different purposes.
38Imperfect marketability is a fundamental characteristic of most bank loans.
39We prefer to interpret like this instead of thinking of the liquidation value of the asset but
it is the same. Actually, given our purpose, we do not consider explicitly the other side of DD:
in fact, in all their game the value that depositors get back depend on the technology where the
bank invested in; for example, the liquidating value equal to the former deposit “has nothing
directly to do with the zero rate of interest on deposits” (p. 409).
40 Why should the depositor withdraw? Because he likes it (he is of the type that, in DD,
17date 2 is after; there are also people of two types, uncertain when to consume.
In this game, we merge these two complete different facts in just the strategy
space; there is no time 2 because not withdrawing can be interpreted either as
withdrawing at the end of the game (when the interest on deposit matures) or
simply withdrawing in period 1 but, as we absorbed the game in one stage, it is
possible to interpret the strategy (NW) when the other withdraws as a sequential
service constraint working: (NW) could simply mean that this depositor arrived
late because the bank had already served the other, running out of assets (the
reserves in our case). There are some possible different outcomes:
is less than their deposited D)
41 and the game ends;
2) if only one investors makes a withdrawal then that investor receives the 2r
(where
42 2r < D, even if, later, I consider the other case) from the cashier, while
nothing remains for the other, and the game ends;
3) finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then the project
matures and the investors make withdrawals decision at date 2; in our game, this
just means that they receive R each, which is the pure Nash equilibrium in the
second game
43.
dies at period 1), or he is just afraid of the other withdrawing (panic run) or, finally, he has
information about bad returns of the bank (fundamental or information-based run as in Jacklin
and Bhattacharya (1988), for example). We may include all these different uncertainty in a
probability distribution but for our purposes this is useless.
41They arrive together at the bank and a proportional rationing rule works: they split equally
has cash greater than half of the deposits.
32According to Gibbons (1992), if both investors make withdrawals at date 2 then each receives
R and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then that investor
receives 2R - D, the other receives D, and the game ends. Finally if neither investor makes a
withdrawal at date 2 then the bank returns R to each investor and the game ends.
Using Gibbons’ informal representation and his slightly different values for the first period,
at date 1 we have
and at date 2
18Roughly, it is like representing a mere liquidity shock (i.e. an unexpected need
for cash that exhaust a bank’s liquidity position
44) so that the bank has rapidly to
sell its assets suffering a probable loss. A solution for the bank could be to raise
the interest rates to attract more funds but, as Guttentag and Herring (1987)
point out, the bank is likely to have limited scope for doing it because potential
lenders tend to ration a bank that signals a willingness to pay more than the
customary for a bank in its category.
Another solution could be a liquidity intervention of other banks, but we as-
sume that it is more and more unlikely to happen in these times of increasing
competition among banks, agreeing with Macchiati (1990)
45, as it is even implicit
in DD where there is really only one bank.
It could simply be observed that DIA could give liquidity without purchasing
the bank, but the commitment to supply infinite liquidity to all banks is more the
duty of the lender of last resort (in general the Central Bank), which, by definition
is discretionary: following Kindleberger (1978), the lender of last resort must exist
but its intervention must be doubtful and its help must be uncertain, even in the
timing of it, so to induce caution in speculators, banks, local administrations and
nations. On the contrary, Guttentag and Herring’s (1983) major policy recom-
mendation is that central banks should be more explicit about their commitment
so that working backwards the unique Nash equilibrium at date 2, is that both investors
withdraw.
Since there is no discounting we can get a one period version of the two period game with
two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (1) both investors withdraw, leading to a payoff of (r,r); (2)
both investors do not withdraw, leading to a payoff of (R,R).
Thus the original two period bank-runs game has two subgame perfect outcomes: (1) both
investors withdraw at date 1, yielding payoffs of (r,r); (2) both investors do not withdraw at
date 1 but do withdraw at date 2, yielding payoffs of (R,R) at date 2.
44 Actually, this may be due not only to bank runs but also to the commitments to lend
to commercial customers (like stand-by credit) which may result in unexpected surges in loan
demand, whose failure, though in many case not illegal, may damage bank reputation (Guttentag
and Herring (1987)).
45 Actually he refers to the interbank agreement for deposit insurance saying that: “it seems
correct to cast some doubts on the fact that, in a system with growing competition, there should
be a spirit of cooperation among different banks”.
On the other side, other banks would be very willing to intervene if they fear a run on all the
system causing effects on interest rates like, as already shown, in the Continental Illinois case.
19to provide lender of last resort assistance.
A more radical approach could be to decentralize the currency supply to avoid
the information and incentive problems that can cause a run. In fact, as Selgin
and White (1994) summarize in a very interesting article, in a free banking system
where banks issue notes (and possibly coins) without statutory reserve require-
ments, they can then “accommodate changes in the public’s desired currency-
deposit ratio simply by changing the mix of their note and deposit liabilities. In
the simplest case, where bank notes alone are normally employed as currency and
the desired reserve ratio for notes and deposits are the same, no change would be
required in the overall quantity of money or bank credit” while, in general, “the
public’s attempts to draw currency from its deposit accounts cause reserve drains
from banks, which forces them to contract their balance sheets” (p. 1722).
Let’s look at this point at the possible alternatives.
3.1. Absence of an insurance fund
This is our simplified version of DD game with (W,W) and (NW, NW) pure Nash
equilibrium
46 which are, also, Pareto-ranked even if this does not tell which is the
more likely (they are both strict ).
The depositor withdrawing before the other gets all the reserves; if they go to-
gether to the bank they share them. In both cases they cannot get back even their
initial amount so that, according to the Directive, their deposit is “unavailable”
and a DIA should intervene
47.
46DD do not consider any mixed strategy equilibrium because, as they state, “is not econom-
ically meaningful” (p. 409).
47We give a numerical example to be clearer. Imagine that D=100, R=120 (think of an
interest rate on the deposit), r=20 (which seems a plausible rate of reserve).Is it true that the mere existence of a DIA should avoid the bank run? Ac-
cording to us this is true only given some institutional conditions.
3.2. Intervention of a Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA)
What we want to show is how different institutional arrangements modify the
game and which one is more suitable to avoid the bank run. It is obvious that if
run can be made a strictly dominated strategy, then there is nothing to worry any
more; and even if withdrawing is a weakly dominated strategy and/or the run is
a weak Nash equilibrium this could be a fair result. There are some conditions
whole original deposit).
Depending on the values, we can get that the optimal strategy for the regulator
condicio creditorum (x=y) and so giving identical claimants the same amount of
money. Note that if x=y=r for any non degenerate probability (if any player
believes that the other will not withdraw with probability p>0) then W will never
be played
48.
In this sense, the agency should not pay back the whole amount of the de-
of the reserve (and/or the amount of money that the bank can recover from the
investment in the technology) the better is for the DIA which has to pay out less
money. So, it would seem optimal from the point of view of the agency to set (if
the agency is connected with the Central bank or is publicly financed) the reserve
requirement to 0 and/or to have the bank investing in highly illiquid assets so
The two pure Nash are (W,W) and (NW,NW).
48In this sense, contrary to DD’s statement in a previous footnote, the belief I am talking about
is simply the probability with which the two players play the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,
as it is common, under another interpretation, to consider “a mixed strategy equilibrium as a
actions” (Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)).
21that in case of difficulty it cannot recover anything back and the cost for the DIA
is minimum. To summarize, just to avoid the run the regulator does not need
repayment beyond a certain level.
Even if from the point of view of avoiding the run, this peculiar option seemed
optimal it is obvious that the other aim of a DIA, the protection of small savers,
would not be tackled: that is why the repayment should be a fair amount with
respect to the deposit. There are many possible cases that can arise (and many
others not tackled in this note) and we will give directly the numerical example
to be clearer.
3.2.1. Partial repayment of deposits
The DIA always pays back a fixed percentage or absolute amount of the money (as
it is in the Directive) (included the liquidity reserves), or this may be interpreted
as a DIA with limited resources, respecting par condicio creditorum  (otherwise
we can interpret it like a maximum amount of resources at DIA’s disposal of 60),
so that the depositor who withdraw anticipating the other one receives 40 from
reserves and 10 from DIA which pays 50 to the other one. Even in this case two
Pareto-ranked Nash equilibrium arise, yet not strict.
Nothing changes if DIA pays pro-rata (still assuming that DIA has 60 or
partially pays back): in fact (W,W) doesn’t change; with asymmetric actions, on
the contrary, who withdraws has a further credit of 60 while the other one should
DIA (namely 22,5 plus the 40 that he had already withdrawn) while the guy who
should be
the situation remains unchanged, even if the run is again a strict Nash.
223.2.2. Unlimited coverage
In this case, if the bank failed, DIA would reimburse wholly and immediately all
depositors the nominal value of their deposit (without the interest rate, because
it would have matured only if depositors had left the money till next period).
Obviously reserves are used before the resources of DIA, but the  par condicio
creditorum  imposes not to create disparities among depositors: so in (NW, W),
who withdrew receives 40 of reserves + 60 from DIA while the other depositors
receives his all 100 from DIA.
It is straightforward to see that the two Nash are still the same: the introduc-
tion of a DIA which, in case of “unavailable deposits” or bank failures, compels
itself to reimburse totally all depositors does not eliminate the risk of bank runs
49.
As already explained, this outcome does not depend on the quantity of the repay-
3.2.3. DIA’s purchase of the bank
The situation changes radically in this case. Now, the bank run is no more a
Nash equilibrium of the game: the only Nash is (NW, NW) and especially this is
a dominant strategy equilibrium  as every player strictly prefers to play NW
compared to W, whatever the other one plays.
The interpretation of this matrix is that DIA purchases
50 the bank, which is
49 Moreover, if DIA had paid back even the interest on deposits in any contingent state, the
run would have remained a Nash equilibrium but the game would have been a trivial form like
this:
50 Even, possibly, for free if there are no other bank that want to buy it.
23deposits: in this way the depositor who withdraws can do it and gets the interest
according to the deposit contract: 0 if W; 20 if NW.
In fact, DIA, after taking over the bank, is not compelled to sell the asset
because has sufficient resources to tackle withdrawals.
This normal form game could be really interpreted in many other ways, like
liquidity supply from other banks or by Central Bank (and the lender of last
resort) but we have already explained that, in this framework, we do not want to
consider a discretionary intervention because from the point of view of depositors
they must be certain of the payoffs (i.e. how much they are paid back in order to
avoid the run). Besides, as Guttentag and Herring (1987) clearly confirm, “central
banks are strongly averse to making guarantees explicit ex ante because they wish
to avoid weakening market discipline and they do not want to commit themselves
to a course of action which they subsequently might prefer not to take; (...) but
the implicit guarantees offered large banks under the policy of ambiguity result
in only minimal ex ante discipline, while experience suggests that the freedom of
action that central bankers seem to prize so greatly is largely illusory” (p. 171)
51.
Moreover, DIA’s purchase of the bank could be an incentive to limit the moral
hazard of the management as shareholders, fearing the eventual loss of control, —
for the DIA to take control of the bank (becoming its shareholder).
DIA should evaluate if the bank is just facing a liquidity crisis, giving help, if
it is so; while, if the crisis is due to mismanagement or even fraud, DIA should
purchase the bank: in this way, the discretionality, not of the intervention but of
the kind of intervention, of the DIA would increase a lot. But our interpretation
of the matrix, in a sense, simply recognizes the importance of the bank run as a
useful way for authorities who were unable to avoid imprudent operations of the
51This point is confirmed by the clumsy actions of the Bank of England in the last years.
Despite the awkward attempt to keep secret the their intervention, it is now common knowledge
that in 1991 the Bank intervened to avoid the failure of three little banks (National Mortgage
Bank, City Merchants Bank and East Anglia Bank), whose failure would have unlikely threat-
ened the stability of the system. The Bank of England “persuaded” other banks to give loans
to the small banks in danger and to pretend that these loans were normal lines of credit. How-
ever these loans were fully guaranteed by the Bank of England: “they were in fact loans of the
Bank” (Financial Times, 10/19/1993). Bank of England is likely to have losses due to these
interventions of 115 millions Pounds (ibidem).
52On the other side, moral hazard is, nearly by definition, a characteristic of shareholders
due to their limited liability (White (1989)), which let them take on risks that they, otherwise,
would have avoided.
24bank to bail it out, taking control of it and eventually replacing the management
and the shareholders. It is implicit in our solution that, as soon the deposit become
“unavailable” (in the meaning of the Directive) a DIA with available funds has the
option of simply supplying liquidity or directly buying the bank, using this sort
of “bank run discipline” 
53. That is why, like in USA for the FDIC, the European
DIAs, even if they come from interbank agreement, should have a sure way (stated
in the rules, not discretionary) of accessing extraordinary lines of credit from the
Treasury or the Central Banks or issuing bonds (perhaps government guaranteed
in order to have a higher rating) to face any kind of situation.
The solution is the same in case of limited resources of DIA (which, again, may
be seen as buyer or just a lender), which supplies funds just for the only depositor
withdrawing (if both withdraw, we come back to the previous case), but we must
assume that
In this way the bank keeps existing without selling their assets and the depos-
itor who does not make a withdrawal will have in the next period the principal
plus the interest, as it is easy to see from this normal form of the game
Even in this case (NW, NW) is a dominant strategy equilibrium.
3.2.4. Partial penalization of withdrawing depositors
Another similar result is obtained if the policy maker exploited, but only in part,
the possibility offered by the paragraph 4 of art. 7 according to which Member
deposit until the amount to be paid under the guarantee reaches the amount of
20.000 ECU.
Why in part? We have already seen above that partial repayment of deposi-
tors leaves the run a Nash equilibrium. What we propose is to use the possibility
53We do not take into account the issue of who is exerting discipline: normally it is easier to
think that not depositors but holders of subordinated debts (who cannot run) are a preferable
means of focusing market discipline (Guttentag and Herring (1987)).
25offered by the Directive to “penalize” only
bank has failed
54.
those who have withdrawn, once the
The run is no more a Nash equilibrium (W is strictly dominated). It does not
matter if DIA reimburses totally (i.e. 120) people who did not withdrew. What
is important is that they can get more by keeping the deposit in the bank.
3.2.5. Insurance intervention of DIA with types of depositors not repaid
According to the regulation of deposit insurance funds in major countries, some
class of depositors (shareholders, other banks, etc. ) and general creditors (with
claims not coming from deposits) are not reimbursed. In this case the payoff
matrix becomes the one just above: in the usual three cases of failure the player
2, not insured, receives only half of or all the reserves if withdrawing or nothing
if he does not withdraw (because the other one, quicker, got all of it).
The bank run is again a pure Nash equilibrium of the game
55. This is an
easy intuition thinking that interbank deposits, generally very consistent, are not
insured: nowadays “the risk of bank run derives much more from the interbank
market and from big banks acting on it than from the fears of small depositors”
(Revell (1985)). Then the exclusion of certain categories from the repayment
or the uncertainty as to who is insured and who is not
56 causes an incentive to
54This sort of punishment ex post is somewhat similar to some suggestion in Baltensperger
and Dermine (1990).
55Note that this is independent of the ROB: even if the payoff for  i = 2 in the case of failure
were zero, the run is a Nash.
56For example, the Italian Interbank Deposit Protection Fund can make intervention only
after the authorization of Bank of Italy, on a voluntary basis, and can refuse the coverage to
26withdraw not only of the not insured but also of the category that should not fear,
undermining the stability of the intermediary.
3.3. Summary
In the end what we find with this simple game is how the outcome can be different
due to various institutional framework.
Going backwards we verified that it is dangerous to exclude types of depositors
from the insurance; it seems more efficient to supply an amount of funds sufficient
to avoid the failure of a bank. In the case of depositors equally insured (namely
with symmetric payoffs), the only way to avoid that the run is a Nash equilibrium
is, with a public policy approach, to modify the outcome so that W is strictly
dominated. This could be even obtained, in theory, without a DIA, with different
rules for banking failures punishing the “unfaithful” depositor who made a with-
drawal before time, but this could violate the par condicio creditorum; otherwise,
we could interpret this game thinking of an asset which can be sold before the
expiration (like a CD or a time deposit) with a sort of penalization in case of an
anticipated sale; finally the optimal solution can imply the existence of a DIA not
supplying liquidity or making a purchase but just legally authorized to penalize
who made the earlier withdrawal, implementing partially art. 7 of the Directive.
But all these consideration are valid only if the DIA exist and the depositor
know for sure that DIA is compelled to act
57: only in that case the payoff matrix
without bank run is valid. Otherwise, if uncertainty prevails (assuming, like in DD,
that is meaningless to speak of mixed strategies), the depositors, “discounting”
the fact that DIA could not intervene, can make the run in equilibrium
58.
It is evident that we avoided to try to fit in the example considerations about
the DIA’s financing and cost of intervention. Banally, we could say that the re-
payment to depositor in case of (NW) is net of the premium paid by the bank to
“persons who in the discretionary and final judgment of the Executive Committee are in any
way not deemed to be deserving of the benefits of the Fund, having helped cause the insolvency
or benefited by it” (art. 27 of the Statutes).
57This has not been an obvious point in some systems. In fact, while quite all of the literature
on deposit insurance coming from USA implicitly assumes that if a DIA exist then it is compelled
to intervene, this has not been true in some European countries, like in Italy as a previous note
briefly explained.
funds that avoids the run, so that even a kind of contribution ex post by banks to the DIA could
be correct.
27the DIA. In presence of a public funded DIA, is not totally relevant to examine the
problem because, when doing concrete policy choices, maximizing social welfare
allow us not to consider the matter of funding DIA (on taxpayers or depositors)
which implies only redistributive problems: if there were no other advantages
in rescue a bank, the net effect would be zero and some criticism could be ac-
cepted. But, ceteris paribus, it is very well known, beyond the eventual damage
to depositor, that a bank failure may have a very large social cost.
This is, of course, quite a rough way of representing reality but it can be shown
that playing, eventually, the repeated game, both finite and infinite, does not
change the basic results. In fact, in the basic game an implicit cooperative strategy
may avoid the run (a fortiori if it infinite) while in the following descriptions,
unless the players behave irrationally, if the run is not even a Nash, it will not be
played.
It remains, nearly on purpose, untackled the problem of the cost of a potential
intervention of the DIA not allowing the bank to fail: the traditional critics,
already quoted, about the cost for taxpayers of these acts, is deceitful. As Merton
e Bodie (1993) explain “in discussions of deposit insurance, it is common practice
to use the cost to the (... ) taxpayer of bailing out the depositors of failed depository
institutions as the measure of the problem. The true cost to our society, however,
is the misallocation of investment and the unintended redistribution of income
and wealth caused by the current system”.
On the other side Di Noia (1994a) shows that in some cases the solutions
proposed by the Directive, with respect to the coordination of different countries’
DIAs may be a bit dangerous and also not completely right because it is possible
that the EU legislator’s fear of competition in grade of coverage could be non
existent.
4. Conclusions
Our simple analysis show that it will be very difficult the implementation of the
new rules in the single countries legislation: it is helpful neither the literature
on the pros and cons of having a DIA, as now EU States will be to have it nor
some of the literature about the costs of a DIA, thinking that, for example, Italian
taxpayers could bear in part the risk of rescuing a Portuguese bank, whose branch
could join the Italian DIA with higher cover.
It seem logic to suggest that every DIA will set a compulsory cover for just the
minimum of 20.000 ECU, possibly only for 90% (as it is allowed in art. 7). Interest
28rates on deposits should not be paid, according to the simple game showed, to
discourage people to withdraw. Besides, the probability of a run on checking
account would drastically decrease “by linking checking services to equity claims
(such as money-market mutual funds accounts) rather than debt claims (such as
demand deposits). There is no point in running on a mutual fund, because there is
no greater expected payoff from closing one account ahead of others. Any fall in
the value of a mutual fund’s assets is shared immediately by all account holders
(Selgin and White (1994))
59. A double regime of insurance is strongly advisable,
together with a revision of the Directive with respect to the coordination problem.
The credibility of a DIA can be established only with exceptional new sources
of funds beyond the premia
60 like borrowing money from Treasuries or Central
Banks or issuing government-guaranteed bonds on the market (or selling them to
the DIAs-member banks). An optional coverage above the 20.000 ECU could be
offered but, in order to avoid a dangerous mingle, by a different agency.
Thinking of a more radical approach, Merton and Bodie (1993) “conclude
that an efficient solution is for commercial lending to be financed by standard
instruments such as debt, preferred stock, and equity, and that deposit insurance
be limited to institutions or accounts that collateralize deposits with US Treasury
bills or their equivalent”; they underline that this proposal is somewhat different
from the “narrow-bank” proposal of Kareken (1986) which “allows bonds of any
maturity to be used for collateral, and does not permit depositories to engage in
other financial activities” (p. 5)
61.
I think that an intermediate approach could be undertaken: according to me,
a sort of “narrow-narrow banking”  could be imposed in Europe. There are
two aspects in my proposal, somewhat similar to Merton and Bodie (1993)
62 and
adapted to the new European framework.
On one side, the banks should invest the 100% of the difference between the
59On the contrary, if the value of bank’s assets falls below the unchanged face value of demand
deposits, the quickest depositors can withdraw the whole amount of their claim, getting a greater
utility than the latest.
60Which in any case, should be somewhat risk (capital) based, following the model of FDICIA.
61As it is widely known, Friedman (1960) had the original idea to require interest-earning
obligations of the U.S. government as 100% reserves against bank demand deposits in order to
achieve a more effective control of money supply. In the wake of this proposal there are other
similar like Litan (1987), Tobin (1985) and Pierce (1991).
62 However, they admit certainly to be “not the first to arrive at (this) solution” but they echo
the view of their “good friend, Stanley Fisher, M.I.T., that in matters of public policy, he would
rather be right than original” (p. 24).
29total amount of deposit insured (a maximum of 20.000 ECU per each depositor’s
account) and the total compulsory reserves
63 in safe assets
64 deposited possibly
in the Central bank; this would serve as a formal or informal collateral for the
insurance agency in case of bankruptcy, as a sort of application of the absolute
priority rule
65. In this way, banking activity is not so restricted as in the standard
“narrow banking” proposal, given that the sum invested in safe assets should allow
them in engaging in different financial activities: in fact, not only the safe amount
should not be so much given the way to calculate it
66 but especially the liability
side of banks’ balance is no more relying only on deposit.
On the other side, they should pay the premia, even flat, for deposit insurance
only on that part, unless, of course they want a supplementary coverage. Someone
could argue that in this case there is no need of an insurance scheme given the
robust collateral for depositor and we agree in part; but the excessive length of the
bureaucratic process to get back the money make the agency useful to anticipate
the money to depositor, trying to recover it afterwards. This could be, in principle,
even a department of the Treasury or of the Central Bank but the eventual conflict
of interest arising suggest an independent agency as the best solution. In this case
depositors would receive interest rates on deposits as the collateral get interest
and the compulsory reserves too.
The problems of coordinating different countries’ DIAs are so big that they
could be solved in various ways: either with a strict coordination of fiscal and mon-
etary policies as proposed by Santomero and Trester (1994); or with the creation
of a European DIA agency, perhaps acting as a body of the European Monetary
Institute (which will develop in the European Central Bank)
67. This European
DIA could have different features: it could insure all European banks; it could
ensure only banks having branches abroad, while small banks should join national
systems; it could be a Fund of the national countries insurance Funds; it could be
63Which are in general deposited c/o the Central Bank.
64It is not clear if a Government bond is a safe asset, though. I would not suggest to Belgian
and Italian bank to invest in their Government bonds: in fact, there, the yields on Government
bonds is much higher than corporate bonds, respectively 0.85% and 1.79% (the Economist,
October 15th), while in all the other major countries is the other way round.
65This is a fundamental common principle of the law of bankruptcy, according to which secured
creditors are entitled to receive the full value of their collateral (up to the amount of their claim)
before any unsecured claims are paid (see Bebchuck and Fried (1994) who, actually, criticize
a.p.r.).
66It might be even zero if the reserve requirements are greater than the insured amounts,
which is possible, for example, if the average amount on each deposit is very high.
67Or it could be a private DIA managed by the European Banking Federation.
30a reinsurance fund; finally, it could be something like a regional agency for Europe
of an international deposit insurance Corporation, modifying the proposal from
Grubel (1973). Otherwise, this “mega DIA” may also converge in a European
compensation scheme which, according to this new “financial guarantee scheme
model” of the European legislator, could have the purpose also of intervene in
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